Introduction
In Australia and other mineral-rich countries, mineral development has resulted in widespread and profound damage to indigenous cultural heritage (Aipin, 1989; Dixon and Dillon, 1990; Moody, 1988; O'Faircheallaigh, 1991) . Legislative initiatives designed to protect indigenous heritage have generally proved ineffective (Bell, 2001; Ritchie, 1994; . Indigenous peoples have continued to seek ways of protecting their heritage (Hornborg, 1994) , and in recent decades another opportunity for doing so has arisen through the negotiation of agreements with mining companies regarding the terms on which development will occur on indigenous land. Agreements between indigenous peoples and mining companies ('mining agreements') 1 are now commonplace in Australia, Canada and the United States (ICME, 1999; O'Faircheallaigh, 2004; Sosa and Keenan, 2001 ) and are also being negotiated in developing countries (Banks and Ballard 1997) .
Indigenous attempts to negotiate protection of their cultural heritage have not been subject to any systematic evaluation. This article makes a substantial contribution in this regard by analysing 41 agreements between Aboriginal peoples 2 and mining companies in Australia, These vary greatly in terms of their extent, content and potential efficacy in providing protection. To allow a more systematic analysis, standard criteria are established for evaluating agreements according to (i) the level of protection they offer to Aboriginal cultural heritage, and (ii) the means they provide for achieving that protection.
The article concludes that mining agreements do have the potential to help protect Aboriginal cultural heritage. However that potential is currently not being realised in many cases in Australia. A majority of agreements do not require a high level of protection or/and fail to provide the resources and processes required to achieve particular levels of protection. A wider analysis of the content of the mining agreements suggests that this 
What is 'Aboriginal cultural heritage'?
In the current context Aboriginal cultural heritage can be seen as having two dimensions.
The first involves material manifestations of Aboriginal occupation during earlier periods of time, including burial sites, middens created by discarded shells and other food debris, rock and cave paintings and scatters of stone tools. These manifestations can be up to 50,000 years old, or only a generation or two removed from the present. The second may be lacking in material manifestations and involves places, sites, areas or landscapes that are of spiritual significance to living Aboriginal people. They may be important for a variety of reasons. Sites or areas that are of special significance are often association with the actions of mythological beings during the creative period of the Dreaming, the time long ago when these beings moved across the landscape and created not only the forms the land now takes, but also the law that governs peoples interactions with the land and each other and the languages and ceremonies that constitute key elements of their culture (see Rose, 1996: 22- 33 for a fuller discussion of Aboriginal concepts of the Dreaming). Certain sites are the resting place of powerful creation spirits. Sites or areas may also be important because they are breeding grounds for key food species, are associated with initiation, mortuary or other ceremonies or because they were the location of important historical events (Dodson, 2003; Palmer and Williams, 1990; Merlan, 1998 ; for a discussion of similar sites in other indigenous cultures, see .
For the Aboriginal traditional owners of land or sea in Australia the distinction between these two categories of 'cultural heritage' is artificial. They see the land and the sea, all of the sites they contain and the knowledge and laws associated with those sites as a single entity that must be protected as a whole, and also see themselves as intimately linked with earlier generations who have used the land and later generations who will use it in the future. In addition, areas of contemporary spiritual significance may contain physical evidence of historical sites and individual physical features such as a set of cave paintings may be associated with a particular spiritual entity (Ilyatjari, 1998; Morphy, 1998) . The unity of land, sea, sites, knowledge, law, culture and people is expressed by Aboriginal people through the use of a single English word, 'country', to refer to all of them.
Country is a word that abbreviates all the values, places, resources, stories and cultural obligations associated with that area and its places. The entirety of our ancestral domains … It is place that also underpins and gives meaning to our creation beliefs -the stories of creation form the basis of our laws and explain the origin of the natural world to us (Dodson, 2003) .
There is an intimate relationship between land, sites and people.
People talk about country in the same way they would talk about a person: they speak to country, sing to country, visit country, worry about country, feel sorry for country, and long for country. People say that country knows, hears, smells, takes notice, takes care, is sorry or happy … country is a living entity with a yesterday, today and tomorrow, with a consciousness, and a will towards life. Because of this richness, country is home, and peace; nourishment for body, mind and spirit; heart's ease (Rose, 1996: 7) .
The 'health' of the group and of relationships among its members depends on the state of the group's country and the sites it contains, and the condition of country and sites reflects the well being of the owners (Bell, 1998; Ilyatjari, 1998; Rose, 2001: 102 A number of general points should be made about sites and areas of contemporary significance in the context of Aboriginal Australia, and about knowledge associated with these. First, sacred or significant sites may have substantial and even dramatic effects on people and these effects can be positive or negative depending on the nature of the site, the people concerned and their behaviour. For instance sites may be gendered, and safe for one sex but dangerous to the other. Some may be safely visited by any male, others only by initiated men of a particular group. Second, knowledge regarding the existence, location and significance of sites is often not public. Knowledge may be secret and sacred and if transferred inappropriately may be dangerous both to the giver and receiver. More generally, there is no assumption in Aboriginal society, as there often is in Western society (Rose, 2001: 94) , that knowledge is a 'public good' that, as a matter of principle, should be widely transmitted:
In Aboriginal societies … personal authority, personal achievement, the authority of seniors, and the integrity and autonomy of local groups depend on control of knowledge through restrictions on its dissemination. Such a system is subverted through any form of 'freedom of information'. If there is one thing that is absolutely not free in Aboriginal culture and society, it is knowledge (Rose, 2001: 98) .
Knowledge is shared and transmitted in the context of relationships among people and between people and land, for example between older and younger people or between individuals who share specific kin connections and interests in country. Knowledge transmission usually occurs both on the basis that potential recipients stand in a particular relationship to informants, and that recipients display certain behaviours and capacities that demonstrate their readiness to receive that information, including a willingness to reciprocate by providing emotional and material support to the informant (Myers, 1980) . It is not unusual, for example, to hear older Aboriginal people say that they have yet to 'hand on' important cultural information because younger people, while in principle being the 'correct' people to receive it, have yet to demonstrate their readiness to do so.
While relevant knowledge regarding sites may be carefully controlled and often withheld from non-Aboriginal people, the dangers associated with damage to sites or inappropriate release of knowledge concerning them is not confined to Aboriginal people. Indeed the consequences of damage to or destruction of particular sites can be catastrophic for nonAboriginal people as well as for their custodians (Gelder and Jacobs, 1998: 67) .
A final point is that it may be possible for Aboriginal people to take remediative measures that help deal with damage to sites. Sites may be 'healed' through appropriate ceremonies, generally designed not to reverse physical damage but rather to 'restore' the site in a spiritual sense (see for example Rose, 2001 ). This may not be an option where a site has been completely destroyed, but even though the damage cannot be remedied it may still be possible to minimise the negative consequences that follow from it, for instance through the ongoing conduct of ceremonies designed to protect those potentially affected.
The Impacts of Exploration and Mining
In considering the efficacy of mining agreements in protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage, it is important to understand how development can affect that heritage. Most obviously and fundamentally, exploration or mining can physically destroy or damage either physical or spiritual sites. For example, the Argyle diamond mine in Western Australia completely destroyed a Barramundi dreaming site that was of regional importance and of special significance to Aboriginal women, an event that had lasting and serious implications for its custodians (Dixon and Dillon, 1990) . There have been numerous examples of exploration activity, for instance bulldozing of seismic lines for oil exploration, destroying or damaging sites (Stead and Niblett, 1985) . Physical damage may also occur as a result of the recreational and other off-site activities of mine workers and their families. Aboriginal custodians face serious dilemmas. The public release of information that is supposed to be secret causes great anguish, and thus people are reluctant to release it unless a site is in imminent danger. However if they do not initially reveal the existence or importance of a site and later do so in an attempt to prevent damage, they are in danger of being accused of 'inventing' the site or exaggerating its importance (Gelder and Jacobs, 1998: 69) . A public inquiry into a proposed dam that would destroy sacred sites near Alice Springs highlighted the dilemma:
Aborigines, working under long inherited laws of protection through secrecy, prefer not to mention the existence of a sacred site, let alone its significance, until it is almost on the point of being destroyed. Europeans find this approach to be very frustrating and, because they do not understand it, will claim that Aboriginal people find sites only after development proposals have been announced. From the Aboriginal point of view this appears to be a surprising attitude since Aborigines know they must maintain secrecy unless … the release of knowledge is … the only way to protect an area (cited in Rose, 2001: 111) .
Thus the way in which information regarding significant sites is treated is critical in avoiding damage to their Aboriginal custodians and to Aboriginal society more widely.
The discussion in the last two sections raises the issue of whether there is a fundamental (Ritchie, 1994; Dillon, 1990; Ritter, 2003) . 3 Much of this legislation is still in place, or has been in place until very recently.
First, key decisions regarding the significance of Aboriginal cultural heritage, whether it should be protected and how protection would be attempted were placed in the hands of non-indigenous bureaucrats or politicians. Such a situation was abhorrent to Aboriginal custodians who under Aboriginal law and custom could not delegate their responsibility for sites, even if they wished to. In addition the non-indigenous people involved lacked specific knowledge regarding sites and often had a worldview different to that of Aboriginal people (Hubert, 1994) . They thus lacked the capacity to effectively protect cultural heritage, even had they been willing to do so, which in fact many were not (see below).
Second, legislation was often limited in scope, focusing heavily on protection of burial sites and artefacts, and ignoring or paying much less attention to sites of contemporary spiritual importance (Ritchie, 1994) . Even where legislation formally placed equal emphasis on both aspects of Aboriginal culture, in practice implementation measures focused on material culture (see for example Dillon, 1990: 40-1) . Thus critical components of Aboriginal culture heritage were excluded from protection. Third, legal ownership of cultural heritage was often vested in the state rather than in Aboriginal custodians, with the result that
Aboriginal people lacked standing in judicial proceedings affecting their cultural heritage.
Fourth, legislative regimes were based around identification of sites and their listing in a register that was, at least in relation to basic information regarding sites, open to the public.
As indicated above Aboriginal people have grave reservations about information regarding sites entering the public domain.
Fifth, bureaucrats and politicians often proved reluctant to invoke the protective provisions of legislation. For instance Ritchie (1994: 224) notes, in relation to legislation introduced in the Northern Territory in the 1960s, that 'despite a number of incidences of damage protected under the Act, no offenders had been detected and no charges had ever been laid'.
Even where officials were willing to act, resources were rarely provided to implement legislation 'on the ground'. This was a major issue given the need to monitor exploration and mining activity across huge areas of land and over the life of mining projects that could last for decades. Dillon (1990: 50-1) , for example, documents how government officers in
Western Australia lacked the resources required to even document the existence of sites, let alone to provide effective protection over time. He records the admission of the Registrar of
Sites that in the wake of exploration and mining activity Aboriginal sites in remote areas 'suffered very badly' (Dillon, 1990: 41) .
A final and fundamental problem was that in the major mineral producing states a central goal of cultural heritage legislation was in fact not to protect sites but to allow their destruction in order to facilitate mineral development. For example Section 18 of Western Australia's Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 provided that the responsible government minister could issue an order allowing a registered sacred site to be employed for 'another purpose'. In the case of exploration or mining, such a declaration would inevitably involve damage to or destruction of a site. This provision was used, for example, to allow oil drilling on a sacred site on the Aboriginal-owned Noonkanbah pastoral property in 1979, and to allow the complete destruction of a key site to allow diamond mining at Argyle (Dillon,1990; Hawke and Gallagher, 1989; Ritter, 2003) . The approach of governments reflected their determination to facilitate development, and the lack of priority they attached to the protection of Aboriginal cultural heritage (O'Faircheallaigh, 2006) . This approach has changed little in recent decades. In September 2006, for instance, the Western Australian and federal governments announced their intention to jointly approve the destruction of some 100 rock carvings, among the world's oldest rock art, to make way for oil and gas development in Western Australia (Lewis and Laurie, 2006 (Hawke and Gallagher, 1989; Moody, 1988: 159-86) . Apart from the uncertain outcomes associated with individual political campaigns, direct political action has two inherent weaknesses as a basis for protecting cultural heritage. First, it has an 'all or nothing' character, and where
Aboriginal people lose political battles they may be denied any chance to mitigate or minimise damage to heritage. Second, it may be feasible to mobilise political support around a small number of high profile projects, but it is not feasible to do so around the scores of mining projects that are initiated in Australia every year.
One further avenue existed to secure protection, through negotiation of legally binding agreements between Aboriginal people and companies undertaking mineral development. The NNTT determines that a mining lease may not be granted to the developer; that it may be granted subject to conditions; or that it may be granted without conditions. The
Tribunal's decision can be overridden by the relevant state or federal government minister, who can in effect allow a project to proceed. However the Right to Negotiate does, for the first time, provide many Aboriginal landowners in Australia with an opportunity to negotiate with mining companies about the terms on which landowners will provide their consent for development.
Additional momentum for agreement making has resulted from the increasing concern of mining companies to demonstrate their 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR) to investors and other stakeholders both in their home countries and in countries where they operate (Ali, 2003; Cragg and Greenbaum, 2002; Crawley and Sinclair, 2003; Day and Affum, 1995; Hood, 1995; Humphreys, 2000; Kapelus, 2002; Mirvis, 2000; O'Faircheallaigh, 2007; Warhrust and Mitchell, 2000) . Achieving the support of local indigenous communities before undertaking projects on their ancestral lands is important in allowing companies to establish their 'CSR credentials', and agreement making is an important mechanism for obtaining and for publicly demonstrating that support. The growing concern of mining companies to achieve indigenous consent and support reflects not only a desire for favourable publicity, but also an increased recognition of the substantial operational and financial risks associated with a failure to do so. In a number of high-profile cases such failure has resulted in the temporary or permanent closure of mines by local populations.
For example Rio Tinto was forced to abandon its US$1.5 billion investment in the Bougainville copper project in Papua New Guinea after its forced closure by local landowners incensed at the environmental damage it had created and dissatisfied with the small share of economic benefits flowing to them. Numerous projects in Australia, Canada, South America, South East Asia, the South Pacific and the United States have experienced costly delays as a result of a failure to gain indigenous support (Ali, 2003; Humphreys, 2000) .
Thus mining companies are more willing to enter agreements with indigenous groups, a fact reflected for instance in the decisions of some firms in Australia in recent years to negotiate agreements in the absence of any legislative requirement to do so (O'Faircheallaigh, 2006) . At the same time, to the extent that agreement making is driven primarily or largely by CSR policies rather than by legal rights and obligations, the content of agreement is ultimately at the discretion of the corporations involved. It cannot be assumed that all companies will match their CSR rhetoric with a willingness to accept significant restrictions on their freedom to develop and operate projects in order to ensure protection of indigenous cultural heritage. Indeed the limited work that examines the behaviour of mining companies engaged in CSR initiatives, rather than simply their public pronouncements and self-generated CSR reports, indicates that mining companies very greatly in their willingness to support their CSR rhetoric with substantive commitments and the resources necessary to deliver on such commitments (Kapelus, 2002; Kelly and O'Faircheallaigh, 2001) . It is therefore important to recognise the potential of varying company policies and practices to affect the cultural heritage provisions of agreements, a point to which we return in analysing such provisions later in the article. Against this background, we now examine the cultural heritage protection provisions of mining agreements in Australia.
The Mining Agreements
Most Australian mining agreements contain legally binding confidentiality clauses. This creates a major problem in learning about, presenting and analysing agreement provisions.
The strategy used to deal with this issue was to seek access to a sufficient number of agreements so that their content could be discussed in aggregate without revealing the identity or the content of individual agreements. Access was gained to agreemen`ts through working as a negotiator for Aboriginal communities; 5 (Miller, 1998: 94; Mohs, 1994: 205). We have not been able to find any substantial discussion of negotiations between indigenous peoples and developers in relation to heritage protection, let alone of criteria to evaluate outcomes from those negotiations. Levels of protection can be envisaged as falling along a spectrum. At one extreme is a complete lack of any protection; mining or related activity can proceed uninhibited by any attention to Aboriginal cultural heritage. At the other end of the spectrum, complete protection is provided where project operators give an unqualified commitment to avoid any damage to cultural heritage. In the latter case, damage must be avoided even if this requires mining to be avoided or abandoned on specific areas of a lease or an entire lease.
Three additional points can be envisaged along the spectrum, each offering a growing level of protection. The first permits damage or destruction or sites to occur, but allows
Aboriginal custodians to take remedial action, for example by removing artefacts or holding ceremonies. The second requires that developers minimise damage to cultural heritage to the extent that this is consistent with commercial requirements. This implies, for instance, that a developer would not be required to adopt a particular approach to protection if this added substantially to project costs. The third requires the developer to avoid damage except where this would make it impossible to proceed with a project. Following this approach, damage would be allowed if a site were co-located with the ore body that was to be developed, because to protect it would render development impossible. However unlike the previous approach it would for instance require a developer to re-route infrastructure if this avoided damage to sites, even if significant additional cost was involved.
This approach leads to a 5-point scale that represents increasing levels of protection as we move up from 1 to 5 through the scale (see Table 1 ). In considering the first two alternatives, which allow damage to sites, agreements cannot be in breach of the legislation in the relevant jurisdiction, and thus an agreement could not condone damage that is prohibited by law. However as noted earlier the protection offered by cultural heritage legislation is often limited, and in addition agreements may require that Aboriginal custodians refrain from triggering relevant legislative provisions.
The cultural heritage provisions of each of the 41 agreements was analysed and classified on the basis of the 'Levels of Protection' set out in Table 1 
2
Sites or areas of significance may be damaged or destroyed, and Aboriginal parties only have an opportunity to mitigate the impact of the damage.
3
The developer must 'minimise' damage, to the extent that this is consistent with commercial requirements.
4
The developer must avoid damage, except where to do so would make it impossible to proceed with the project.
5
There is an unqualified requirement to avoid damage. and/or the form it will take. This provides a basis on which they can reconcile their desire to share in the benefits of development with their desire to protect their cultural heritage and information surrounding it.
On the other hand a larger number of agreements, 13 or 32 per cent of the total, contain no or very limited protections, allowing at best for impact mitigation, for instance through the removal of artefacts. Twenty agreements or nearly half of the total achieve a score of 2.5 -
3.5
, that is they contain at least some provisions requiring that projects must be modified to minimise damage, consistent with commercial requirements. An obvious and important question is why Aboriginal people enter into agreements that offer limited protection of their cultural heritage. We consider this question below in providing an overall analysis of the findings.
Cultural heritage protection: activities, processes and resources
Turning to the activities, processes and resources applied to securing a desired level of A second requirement involves explicit protection of knowledge provided by Aboriginal people as part of a cultural heritage protection regime. As mentioned above unauthorised release of information regarding significant sites can cause serious damage to Aboriginal people. As a result cultural information required for effective identification and management of sites is unlikely to be forthcoming unless agreements contain provisions to secure its protection (Stead and Niblett, 1985: 4) . More broadly, explicit protection of cultural heritage knowledge, combined with Aboriginal control of the cultural heritage process, can assist in reconciling the desire of Aboriginal people to benefit from commercial development while at the same time ensuring that private and/or sacred information is treated appropriately.
A thirds area involves provision of financial and other resources to support cultural heritage surveys and facilitate the effective participation of the appropriate Aboriginal people.
Relevant expenditures include wages or per diem payments for knowledgeable Aboriginal people, and access to transport, accommodation and meals. As noted earlier implementation of cultural heritage protection in Australia and other jurisdictions has often failed in part because of the absence of such resources (Dillon, 1990; Harries, 2005; , indicating the critical role they play. However it is not sufficient for an agreement to provide the resources required to undertake specific activities related to identification and management of individual sites. An indigenous community's ability to contribute to effective protection depends on its general capacity to sustain, transmit and apply cultural knowledge (UNESC, 1994: 3, 5) . Thus a fourth area involves agreement provisions designed to support and enhance that capacity. These might involve company funding for community activities that promote cultural vitality, or for Aboriginal cultural heritage workers whose responsibilities range well beyond protection measures for the project concerned.
Aboriginal custodians may not be aware, in advance, of all significant heritage sites in an area that will be disturbed by mineral development. This may reflect the antiquity of the sites and the fact that they have been buried over long periods of time, or the removal or exclusion of Aboriginal people from the area in the colonial period. Thus a fifth requirement is for processes that allow traditional owners to at least temporarily stop project activities where previously undiscovered sites are threatened or damaged, allowing protective or remediative measures to be put in place. Finally, general educative and preventative measures are required to help prevent threats to sites from arising in the first place. Such measures might include cultural awareness training for company employees and contractors, to give them an appreciation of the importance of indigenous culture, allow them to quickly recognise undiscovered sites, and make them aware of specific protection measures provided under an agreement. Measures might also include the rehabilitation of exploration drill lines to reduce the possibility that non-indigenous people (for example tourists) might gain access to protected areas or sites. Table 3 summarises these six areas. The potential contribution of agreements to effective cultural heritage protection depends on how many of the elements listed in Table 3 they contain. In other words, this list is cumulative. The more elements are contained in an agreement, the greater the likelihood that a desired level of protection will actually be achieved. This is in contrast to Table 1 , which present alternative levels of cultural heritage protection organised in a hierarchy.
The 41 agreements were analysed, and each awarded a point for each element from Table 3 that it includes. Possible scores thus range from 0, where none of the elements are included, to 6, where all are included. In this case eight of the agreements proved difficult to classify, as certain key components of their cultural heritage provisions contained for instance two elements, whereas others contained three. As with levels of protection, this situation has been addressed by awarding the agreements intermediate scores such as 2.5. However in many cases that potential is not being realised, or being fully realised.
There is not a clear correlation between scores achieved by agreements for 'Level of protection' and for 'Activities, process and resources'. None of the eight agreements that achieved a 'Level of protection' of 4 or 5 achieved a score of 5 in the rating for activities, processes and resources. This highlights the fact that including a requirement for a high level of protection in an agreement is no guarantee that this level of protection will actually be achieved. However, only one of these eight agreements achieved a score of less than 3
for 'Activities, processes and resources', indicating that the factors allowing achievement of a high level of protection (discussed below) also had some bearing on provisions dealing with activities, processes and resources. A number of agreements that scored 4 or 5 on 'Activities, processes or resources' scored substantially lower on 'Level of protection'. This may indicate that the companies involved were prepared to engage in activities related to cultural heritage management and commit resources to these activities, possibly driven by a desire to be seen to accommodate Aboriginal interests, but were unwilling to negotiate any substantial constraints on their freedom to develop their projects in order to protect Aboriginal cultural heritage.
Conclusion and Analysis
Negotiation and agreement making are increasingly being utilised to structure relationships between indigenous peoples nation state sand commercial interests. This analysis of Australian experience indicates that in relation to cultural heritage, negotiated agreements do have the potential to protect indigenous interests, as indicated by the fact that some agreements require high levels of protection and indeed may result in projects being substantially reconfigured or even abandoned in order to ensure heritage protection. Certain (e) Provisions that allow traditional owners to temporarily stop project activities to protect previously unknown sites.
(f) More general measures designed to support a system of cultural heritage protection. What explains these outcomes? One possible explanation is that Aboriginal groups are involved in deliberate trade-offs in the negotiation process, and that some groups have chosen not to pursue stronger cultural heritage provisions in return for concession from mining companies in other areas, such as financial benefits or employment and training programs. Carmichael, Hubert and Reeves (1994: 6) , for instance, suggest the possibility of such an outcome in the broader context of commercial development on indigenous land. (Altman, 1983 ) and Queensland's Mineral Resources Act 1989 (O'Faircheallaigh, 1999 ).
An alternative explanation is that the outcomes summarised above are the result of This discussion highlights an important tissue in relation to the role of direct action in protecting Aboriginal cultural heritage. As noted in an earlier section, direct action on its own may not be a basis for achieving protection. However the ability to credibly threaten such action may be important in allowing Aboriginal groups to negotiate agreements that offer effective protection.
The agreements that score poorly on the two scales were nearly all negotiated under the terms of the Native Title Act (NTA). As mentioned above the NTA places Aboriginal groups in a weak negotiating position because they cannot prevent development if they are unable to negotiate effective measures for protecting their cultural heritage. If they do not reach agreement the matter is referred to the National Native Title Tribunal, which can refuse to grant a mining lease; grant it subject to conditions; or grant it without conditions. In the 12 years since the introduction of the NTA, the Tribunal has in every single such case referred to it determined that mining leases can be granted, and has refused to attach conditions relating to cultural heritage protection (or to other matters of interest or concern to the indigenous parties to the grant of leases). 9 In addition, the NTA prohibits the NNTT from determining compensation for Aboriginal groups based on the value of the minerals concerned or the profits won from their exploitation, whereas Aboriginal groups are free to pursue compensation based on the value of minerals or on profits during the negotiation period. In this situation indigenous groups are under enormous pressure to reach agreement, even if they are dissatisfied with the level of cultural heritage protection being offered by the company concerned. The alternative is that they are denied an opportunity to negotiate substantial compensation, and they still fail to achieve of their cultural heritage. This is a key part of the explanation as to why many Aboriginal groups have entered into agreements that offer limited or little protection to their cultural heritage.
Where Aboriginal groups are supported by organizations that are well resourced and politically powerful, they can in effect overcome at least some degree the weak legal position created for them by the NTA. However many groups do not enjoy such support. This is particularly so in 'settled Australia' (New South Wales, Victoria, southern Western Australia and Queensland). Here Aboriginal people have had much greater difficulty than in northern Australia in winning legal and political recognition, and their organisations tend to have limited access to resources and limited political influence.
9
A major implication of these findings is that mining agreements will be limited in their This study has wider implications for three reasons. First, while considerable diversity exists among indigenous peoples, the cultural heritage and related knowledge they seek to protect has much in common (Barsh 1999; Miller 1998) . So too do the large-scale industrial projects that can threaten indigenous heritage. Thus the evaluative criteria developed here, or similar criteria, can be useful for other indigenous peoples in developing and assessing proposals for protecting cultural heritage from the effects of industrial and commercial development. Second, this study highlights the fact that even if negotiated agreements specify outcomes that are highly advantageous to indigenous interests, they will have little positive effects unless agreements also deliver the processes and resources required to render their provisions effective in practice. Finally and of broader relevance is the finding that many mining agreements in Australia fail to offer substantial protection and that this is related to weaknesses in the underlying bargaining positions of Aboriginal peoples involved. This indicates that indigenous peoples must first address the power imbalances they often confront in dealing with developers and governments (Evans, Goodman and Lansbury 2002) if negotiated agreements are to help them restructure their relationships with dominant societies to their advantage.
Notes

